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11. Introduction 
Since the presentation of the first modern economic model of criminal behavior by Becker 
(1968), numerous efforts have been devoted to the application of empirical economic approaches 
to both the study of crime and the criminal justice system. A large literature has especially 
focused on the deterrent effect of punishment1. 
Ehrlich (1973, 1975) is often considered as the first economist to rely on econometric 
models to analyze the deterrent effect of criminal law enforcement, through the estimation of a 
murder supply function, which depends on economic and deterrence variables. Recent studies 
have attempted to understand why crime has fallen sharply during the 1990s in the United States. 
Donohue and Levitt (2001, 2003) suggest there is a strong causal link between legalized abortion 
and reductions in crime almost two decades later, when the cohorts exposed to legalized abortion 
reach their peak crime years. Following Levitt (2004), the other factors playing a critical role in 
crime reduction are the increasing number of policemen, the skyrocketing number of prisoners 
and the ebbing of the crack epidemic
2
. 
The broken windows theory developed by Wilson and Kelling (1982) has strongly 
influenced policing and law enforcement. According to this criminological theory, targeting 
minor disorder is expected to reduce occurrence of more serious crimes. For instance, some 
aspects of the broken windows theory have been adopted in the largest cities of the United States  
through a more aggressive enforcement of minor offences. However, little is known on the 
relevance of the broken windows theory; recent results from a randomized experiment cast doubt 
on the effectiveness of zero-tolerance policing (Harcourt and Ludwig, 2006). 
In a recent empirical study conducted in Switzerland, Funk and Kugler (2003) have 
investigated the dynamic interrelationships between crimes of different severity, i.e., larceny-
theft, burglary and robbery. Using quarterly time series data covering the period from 1984 to 
1998, the authors estimate a VAR model and reach the two following conclusions. On the one 
hand, “an evolution from mild offences to severe offences occurs independent of a varying 
degree of enforcement activity” (p. 295). On the other hand, an increase in the enforcement 
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 On recent developments on the theory of deterrence, see Polinsky and Shavell (2007) or Levitt and Miles (2006), 
who provide a recent overview of the economic contributions to the understanding of criminal activities. 
2
 Levitt (2004) underlines that good economic conditions, aging population, innovative policing strategies over the 
recent years, gun control laws, laws allowing the carrying of concealed weapons and increased use of the death 
penalty have a deterrent, but limited effect on crime. 
2activity of mild offences not only reduces minor crimes, but also dynamically deters subsequent 
severe offences. 
This finding, which supports the broken windows theory, holds in a setting where robbery 
increases the level of resources of the delinquents. Insofar as this kind of offence is likely to 
secure a long-term career in crime, the broken windows theory may be seen as an implication of 
the life-cycle theory. This explains why the punishment of minor offences is likely to have a 
preventive effect on more severe acts. Stigler (1970) has proven the exact opposite with his 
marginal deterrence theory: inflicting smaller punishments to less severe crimes is expected to 
generate incentives for individuals who cannot be fully deterred from committing less harmful 
crimes. In that case, the punishment of the most severe offences is likely to be the strongest 
deterrent factor of minor offences. 
A question of interest is to know whether there may be differences between crimes 
bringing psychic gains and crimes bringing monetary gains. In this paper, we focus on the case of 
an offence category characterized by the absence of monetary benefits. Using original cross-
section time series collected in France over the period 1988 to 1993 from 30 appeal court areas, 
we study the determinants of offences providing only psychic benefits to criminals: rapes and 
other sexual offences. We study whether the punishment of less severe sexual offences has a 
deterrent effect on the most severe offences (rapes), testing the broken windows theory against 
the marginal deterrence theory. We estimate both random and fixed effects regressions. Our main 
results indicate that the enforcement activity of rapes is the most deterrent factor both for rapes 
and for other sexual offences, compared with of rapes- and minor sexual offences-reducing 
impact of an increase in the enforcement activity for minor sexual offences. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we briefly review 
the literature related to the broken windows theory. Our data are described in Section 3 and we 
present the econometric procedure in Section 4. We discuss the results and the relevance of the 
broken windows theory in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Background on the broken windows theory 
The broken windows theory was developed in an influential contribution of Wilson and 
Kelling (1982). The authors focused on the consequences of the ‘Safe and Clean Neighborhood 
3Program’ launched in the State of New Jersey during the mid-1970s. One of measure of this 
program consisted in using foot patrols as a way of cutting crime. 
Results from a controlled experiment suggest that these foot patrols have no direct effect 
on crime rated, but the neighborhood has become more secure. Emphasis is thus made not only 
on violent and criminal individuals, but also on more disorderly people (Zimbardo, 1969)3. As 
pointed out in Wilson and Kelling (1982, p. 31), crime and disorder are strongly interrelated: 
“Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken 
and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. This is as true in nice 
neighborhood as in run-down ones”. So, the main idea behind the broken windows theory is that 
targeting less severe forms of disorder may temper bad criminal behaviors.  
In the US, more aggressive laws against minor misdemeanor have been adopted in the 
largest cities, in particular New York, Chicago and Los Angeles. These public policy choices 
could suggest that the reducing effect of broken windows policing in crime is indeed effective. 
However, there is no supporting fact to the claim that broken-windows policing significantly 
reduced crime during the 1990s in the US (Eck and Maguire, 2000). More recent findings, 
described in Kelling and Sousa (2001) and Corman and Mocan (2005), suggest that in New York, 
the large increase in misdemeanor arrest rates is responsible for the significant city’s drop in 
crime. 
Since misdemeanor arrests usually do not result in imprisonment, this suggests that 
deterrence is an appropriate explanation of the causal link between a generalized program of 
intensive enforcement and the fall in more serious crime. However, Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) 
propose a very different interpretation, called the Newton’s Law of Crime. They show that the 
pattern of crime strongly changes across New York precincts during the 1990s: “those precincts 
that received the most intensive broken windows policing during the 1990s are the ones that 
experienced the largest increases in crime during the city’s crack epidemic of the mid- to late-
1980s”. So, the jurisdictions with the largest rise in criminal rates during the latter period simply 
experience the largest fall after, which is consistent with the statistical concept of mean reversion. 
Furthermore, drawing on the Moving To Opportunity experiment, Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) 
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 Zimbardo (1969), a psychologist, was the first to present evidence consistent with the broken windows theory, with 
an experiment. Two identical cars without any license plate were abandoned in two different locations, respectively 
in the Bronx (New York) and in Palo Alto (California). The car was almost immediately attacked in the first place. In 
Palo Alto, the public destruction of the car begins only one week after abandon, once the car was personally 
damaged by Zimbardo. 
4present additional evidence that moving people to communities with less disorder does not 
change their criminal behavior
4
. 
At first sight, the broken windows theory stands in contrast with the idea of marginal 
deterrence developed in Stigler (1970). The threat of punishment is expected to influence the 
behavior of individuals who are about to commit a crime. The deterrent effect of punishment is 
affected by the extent to which the threat of punishment is indeed realized, by the celerity with 
which punishment is delivered and of course by the level of pain imposed. The increase in 
marginal utility when committing a crime will be compared with the risk of punishment. When 
the punishment is large, this clearly reduces the expected utility for the offender. However, 
“marginal decisions are made here as in the remainder of life, and the marginal deterrence of 
heavy punishments could be very small or even negative” (Stigler, 1970, p. 57). 
So, the difference between the broken windows theory and the marginal deterrence theory 
may be summarized in the following way. According to the former, the punishment of minor 
offences should have a preventive effect on more harmful acts, while the punishment of the most 
severe offences should have a strong deterrent impact on minor offences according to the latter. 
A question of interest is to know whether there may be differences between crimes bringing 
psychic gains and crimes bringing monetary gains.  
Indeed, some criminals cannot reach their objective without behaving violently. Rapes or 
some types of murders like those committed in order to take one’s revenge are good examples. 
The existence of these kinds of specific offences raises interesting questions. Do more severe 
punishments inflicted to the authors of the most “severe” crimes generate incentives to potential 
offenders not to commit any crime at all? For rapists or potential rapists who are not deterred by 
more severe sentences, should increased legal sanctions of “minor” sexual crimes have an effect 
on their behavior? We aim at answering these questions in our empirical analysis. 
3. Data 
For our empirical analysis, we rely on original longitudinal data collected in France from 
1988 to 1993 (6 years). The data set includes detailed information about sexual offences and 
convictions observed in the different appeal court areas. There are 30 court areas in France, 
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 The impact of neighborhood effects on criminal behavior through the Moving To Opportunity experiment are 
further investigated in Kling et al. (2005). 
5presented in Figure 1, so the dataset is made of 180 observations. Let us briefly describe the 
treatment of sexual attacks in the French penal system. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
As in other developed countries, offences are categorized on the basis of the harms they 
generate. A distinction is made between two types of sexual offences: rapes and other sexual 
offences. First, rapes belong to the most harmful category, the “crimes”
5
. Murders and some 
assaults and battery are included in this category. Second, other sexual offences include indecent 
assaults, engaging minors in indecent acts and other offences against public decency; they are 
defined as “délits”.  
These two offences lead to different sanctions. The authors of crimes are judged in a 
Court of Assizes (“cour d’assises”). They are severely punished and incur longer prison 
sentences than the delinquents who are authors of délits. The latter are judged in a magistrate’s 
court; they face a prison sentence whose length depends on the seriousness of their offence. They 
also may incur either a fine or other kinds of sentences, like a substitution penalty or an 
educational program. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables of the sample are shown in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 here 
First, we have two measures of sexual offences: 
itRAPE  is the rate of rapes per 1000 
inhabitants in region i  (a court area in our context) during year t ; itOSO  is the rate of other 
sexual offences per 1000 inhabitants. These two outcomes are expected to be influenced by 
enforcement activities. Concerning rapes, enforcement activities are measured through the 
probability of conviction for rapes ( RAPEitC ) and the conditional probability of a prison term for 
rapes ( RAPE
itP ). The variable 
RAPE
itC  is the number of convictions for rapes divided by the number 
of offences in this category of crime, and RAPE
itP  is the number of prison sentences for rapes 
divided by the number of convictions for rapes
6
. The average prison sentence for rapists in region 
i  at time t  is denoted by Sit
RAPE . 
                                                
5
 In the French penal code, a rape is defined as an act of sexual penetration committed on others by violence, 
constraint or surprise (art. 222-23). 
6
 Unfortunately, the resources of the police and justice services data are not available, nor the clearance rate data, 
regardless of the offence category. 
6We have similar information for other sexual offences. The enforcement activity of minor 
sexual offences is measured through the conviction rate OSOitC , which is the number of 
convictions for minor sexual offences divided by the number of minor sexual offences, and the 
conditional probability of being sentenced to prison OSO
itP . We also have information about the 
conditional probability of receiving a fine for other sexual offences OSOitF  and the conditional 
probability of another decision for sexual offences OSOitD  (either a substitution penalty or an 
educational measure). 
We also include the following control variables in our empirical analysis. First, we denote 
by 
itDU  the first difference of the log of the unemployment rate, i.e., 1lnln −−= ititit UUDU  with 
itU  the level of unemployment. This covariate may be considered as a proxy for socio-economic 
conditions
7
. Secondly, we include an explanatory variable related to the population of each 
appeal court area. We rely on a measure of density 
itRPOP  defined as the ratio between the 
population size of the appeal court area i  at time t  and the total population size living in France 
at time t . 
According to Table 1, the rate of rapes (per 1000 inhabitants) amounts to 0.75%, while the 
rate of other sexual offences is about 7 times higher (5.37%). As shown in Figure 2, we observe 
an increasing profile over time for the two types of offences. The rate of rapes ranges from 5.8% 
in 1988 to 8.9% in 1993, i.e., an increase of 53.4%. The rise in the rate of other sexual offences is 
also substantial (+32.1%, ranging from 47.6% in 1988 to 62.9% in 1993).  
Insert Figure 2 here 
Concerning sanctions, the probability of conviction is much higher for rapes than for other 
sexual offences, respectively 19% instead of 12%. The same pattern holds for the conditional 
probability of a prison term. The rate is about four times higher for rapes, this sanction being 
quasi-certain (99.7%). Among the different sanctions associated with the other sexual offences, 
the most frequent ones are a prison term (24.7%) and a fine (14.6%). Other decisions for other 
sexual offences are less frequent (6.4%). 
                                                
7
 Because men commit a large majority of sexual offences, the variation in male unemployment rate would 
undoubtedly be a more relevant independent variable, but this information is not available at the level of aggregation 
sought. 
74. Empirical analysis 
The aim of our econometric analysis is to know whether an increase in the enforcement 
activity of minor sexual offences has a reducing impact or not on the number of rapes. Turning to 
a logarithmic specification, we estimate the following equation: 
( )
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where itε  is a random perturbation such that );0(~
2
εσε Nit  and iκ  is an error term specific to 
each appeal court area. The coefficients 1β , 2β , 3β  and 4β  will shed light on the correlation 
between enforcement activities of other sexual offences and rapes. Since the dependent variable 
is continuous in (1), we turn to a linear model to estimate the various α , β  and γ .  
Since we have panel data, we control for unobserved heterogeneity in (1) through the use 
of random and fixed effects models. When the different iκ  are uncorrelated to the selected 
explanatory variables, the appropriate specification is a random effects model which is estimated 
by Generalized Least Squares. Conversely, if the specific components iκ  are correlated with the 
covariates, then the correct specification is a fixed effects model and the linear regression 
includes a set of appeal court area dummies as additional covariates. We perform a Hausman’s 
specification test to assess the relevance of both models. 
With respect to our question of interest, a difficulty is that the probability of conviction 
for rapes may be endogenous in (1). Recalling that unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for in 
(1), through the inclusion of fixed effects, endogeneity is likely to arise because of simultaneity 
issues. The different sanctions that are implemented in case of other sexual offences should be 
themselves influenced by the occurrence of these offences. This comment has two implications. 
On the one hand, the number of sexual attacks observed in the past should matter, but there are 
not enough years in the survey to account for these dynamic aspects
8
. On the other hand, the use 
of the various sanctions related to other sexual offences should be endogenous in (1), which 
concerns both OSOitCln , 
OSO
itPln , 
OSO
itFln  and 
OSO
itDln . In what follows, we restrict our attention to 
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 A more appropriate specification would be to include the lagged rate of rapes in the rape equations, and the same 
should be done for other sexual offences.  
8the potential endogeneity of the conviction rate OSOitCln . This endogenous covariate is expressed 
as: 
ititit
OSO
it XOSOC ζφ +Ψ⋅′+⋅=ln                 (2) 
where the rate of other sexual offences itOSO  is an instrument insofar as an increase in offences 
triggers a change in the enforcement activity, itX includes all exogenous regressors introduced in 
(1), φ  and Ψ  are coefficients to estimate, and itζ  a random perturbation normally distributed9.   
We proceed in the same way to measure the role of enforcement activities related to rapes 
on other sexual offences. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:  
( )
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The reducing-impact of enforcement activities with respect to rapes on the rate of other 
sexual offences will be given by the various 'α . We again include fixed effects to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, we treat the rate of conviction for rapes as endogenous:  
ititit
RAPE
it XRAPEC ζφ +Ψ⋅′+⋅= ''ln                 (4) 
where the rate of rapes is an instrument. We use both the 2SLS random-effects specification 
described in Balestra and Varadharajan-Krishnakumar (1987) and the 2SLS within estimator to 
estimate the recursive models, respectively given by (1) and (2) and by (3) and (4).  
5. Results and discussion 
 The random and fixed effects estimates of equations (1) and (3) with exogenous 
enforcement activities are reported in Table 2. The Hausman test suggests the adoption of a 
random effect specification for the rape equation and of a fixed effect representation in the other 
sexual offence equation. This means that the unobserved court area components are correlated 
with the set of regressors that explain other sexual offences.  
Insert Table 2 here 
A first finding is the positive relationship between unemployment rate variation and both 
rapes and minor sexual offences. Recalling that these offences do not allow their authors to grow 
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 We have also considered the log of the rate of other sexual offences as an instrument (instead of OSO). We find 
similar results with both specifications. 
9rich, but do exclusively bring psychological benefits, one cannot interpret this result in terms of 
falling opportunity costs of crime encouraging even more offences (Cantor and Land, 1985). 
Also, since unemployment is a proxy for the business cycle, we cannot say that of the three 
effects linking business cycles to crime, the motivation effect (i.e., the incitation to commit 
crime) dominates (Becker, 1968).  
To explain the sexual offences-unemployment relationship, one could consider that an 
unemployed person is more likely to be stigmatized as “a social failure”, “a second-class citizen” 
or “inferior” (Goffman, 1963, Kelvin and Jarret, 1985). As a result of this stigma on 
unemployment, tindividuals become more often self-conscious and they will suffer from 
discouragement, anxiety and frustration. Thus, the unemployed are more likely to be exposed to 
the lure of criminal subcultures because of their lack of involvement in conventional and familial 
activities (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990).  
Another result from the estimated equations is that the density of population positively 
affects the rape rate. Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) explain this pattern by higher returns of crime, 
lower probabilities of arrest and conviction, and density of female-headed households. 
Conversely, the density of population has a negative and significant effect on the rate of other 
sexual offences. According to the fixed effects estimates reported in Table 2, an increase of 1% 
of the population of court areas is associated with a 0.235% decrease in the OSO rate. An 
explanation could be that minor sexual offenders perceive the risk of conviction as higher when 
population is more concentrated. 
Let us now focus on the deterrence effect of penalties. In conformity with the economic 
theory of crime, in the rapes equation, we get negative signs for the conviction and imprisonment 
rates related to rapes, as well as the average prison sentence for rapists (see Table 2). We also 
find a negative correlation between rapes and both the probability of being sentenced to prison 
and the probability of receiving a fine because of other sexual offences. In the same way, we note 
that the probability of a prison term for rapes and the conviction rate related to OSO reduces the 
rate of other minor sexual offences. Another result is that the conditional probability of receiving 
a fine for other sexual offences has a negative and significant effect on rapes. The correlation is 
also negative, albeit not significant, in the OSO equation
10
. 
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 The risk of another decision (either substitution penalty or educational measure) does not exert a statistically 
significant effect in the OSO equation, even if it shows the expected sign 
10
Surprisingly, the sentence-length coefficient is positive in the rapes equation (at the 10% 
level). According to Mustard (2003), this ambiguous result can be due to the fact that sentencing 
data contain measurement errors biasing the results towards zero. Indeed, sentence length does 
not measure time served, insofar as early release and parole reduce it. In other words, the time 
served in prison is usually overestimated. Moreover, Mustard (2003) shows that the sentence 
length is correlated with offenders’ criminal histories, more precisely the rate of repeat offenders, 
which cannot be controlled for at the aggregate level of this analysis. This finding also suggests 
that sexual offenders are not risk averse utility maximizing criminals and that they respond more 
to changes in the probability of punishment than to a change in the severity of punishment. 
So far, we have neglected the potential endogeneity of the conviction rates. In Table 3, we 
present our IV random and fixed effects estimates. Our results are twofold. First, an increase of 
1% in the probability of conviction for rapes is associated with a 0.335% fall in the rate of other 
sexual offences with the IV random effects estimates (and 0.25% with the fixed effects 
specification). Secondly, the probability of conviction for other sexual offences has now a 
significantly, negative effect on the rate of rapes (with a decrease comprised between 0.659 and 
0.734%). It thus matters to control for endogeneity bias as these conviction variables were not 
statistically significant in our previous estimates, although they had the correct sign. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Our results shed light on the possible relevance of the broken windows theory. Let us first 
note that in all estimated equation, we get a negative relationship between the various OSO
deterrence variables and rapes. Nevertheless, in the IV regressions, only the probability of 
conviction and the conditional probability have a significant influence. On a priori grounds, this 
pattern is not inconsistent with the broken windows theory: punishing less severe offences leads 
to a decrease in the occurrence of more severe offences. Although the relationship is less robust, 
it is interesting to note that sexual offenders seem reactive to specific monetary sanctions, while 
they are often assumed not to intentionally commit their act (and thus are supposed to be 
nondeterrable). 
Another result from the French data is that in the rapes regression, the “crossed-effect” of 
conviction is much lower than that of the conditional risk of prison for rapes, respectively -0.724 
instead of -4.101 according to the IV random effect estimates. Undoubtedly, this finding does not 
provide support to the broken windows theory. According to our estimates, the conditional risk of 
11
prison for rapes appears to be the most influential deterrent factor of rapes among the various 
conditional risks of sanction variables. Conversely, an increase in the enforcement activity for 
minor sexual offences has a smaller (but significant) influence on the most harmful sexual 
offences.  
This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that the conviction rate for rapes and 
especially the condition probability of imprisonment for rapes have the strongest deterrent effects 
in the other sexual offences equations. The coefficients are respectively equal to -0.335 and -
2.748 in the IV random effects regression, while the deterrent effect of the conviction rate for 
minor sexual offences is lower (-0.205). The sign of the sentence length for rapes is also negative, 
but not significant at conventional levels. Taken all together in consideration, our results suggest 
that the marginal deterrence theory is certainly much more relevant than the broken windows 
theory to explain the behavior of sexual offenders.
6. Concluding remarks
Our study of rapes and other sexual offences using French panel data leads to the two 
following conclusions. First, the economic model of crime seems validated when considering 
sexual offences. Secondly, the enforcement activity of rapes is the most deterrent factor both of 
rapes and other sexual offences, compared with the rapes- and minor sexual offences-reducing 
impact of an increase in the enforcement activity for minor sexual offences. Hence, our results 
tend to cast doubt on the predictions of the broken windows theory in the case of an offence 
category featured by the absence of monetary benefits.  
From a normative perspective, our results suggest that it would be more efficient to deter 
the authors of rapes rather than those of less severe sexual offences. Such policies are indeed 
expected to generate positive externalities since they should provoke a more important decrease 
in the rate of other sexual offences, as suggested by the marginal deterrence theory. A final 
comment deals with possible extensions of our study. Because of data availability, we have 
focused on the 1988-1993 period. Given the recent changes in policing in France, it would be 
useful to further analyze the trends in the various forms of offences since the 2000s. We leave 
this issue for future research. 
12
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Figure 2. Changes in rates of rapes and other sexual offences 1988-1993 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample (N=180) 
Variables Definition Mean s.d. 
Crime   
 RAPE Rate of rapes per 1000 inhabitants  0.075  0.026 
 OSO Rate of other sexual offences, per 1000 inhabitants 0.537  0.141 
Sanctions   
 C
RAPE
Probability of conviction for rapes 0.190  0.091 
 P
RAPE
 Conditional probability of a prison term for rapes 0.997  0.016 
 SRAPE Average length of the prison term for rapes 97.750  22.833 
 COSO Probability of conviction for other sexual offences 0.120  0.038 
 POSO Conditional probability of imprisonment for other sexual 
offences 
0.247  0.085 
 F
OSO
 Conditional probability of a fine for other sexual offences 0.146  0.104 
 D
OSO
 Conditional probability of an other decision for other sexual 
offences 
0.064  0.041 
Other covariates   
 DU Difference in unemployment rates 0.028 (0.084) 
 RPOP Population size of the appeal court area divided by total 
population size living in France 
3.333 (2.468) 
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Table 2. Random and fixed effects estimates of rapes and other sexual offences 
Variables ln(RAPEit) ln(OSOit) 
 Random effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects 
lnC
RAPE
it -0.233*** -0.230*** -0.035 -0.024 
(5.95) (5.79) (1.15) (0.81) 
lnPRAPEit -2.414** -2.032* -3.257*** -2.925*** 
(2.39) (1.96) (4.16) (3.76) 
lnSRAPEit 0.164* 0.122 0.051 0.036 
(1.89) (1.32) (0.75) (0.51) 
lnCOSOit -0.091 -0.065 -0.334*** -0.337*** 
(1.32) (0.89) (6.19) (6.16) 
lnP
OSO
it -0.102* -0.017 -0.133*** -0.078 
(1.69) (0.26) (2.81) (1.61) 
lnF
OSO
it -0.082** -0.089*** -0.023 -0.034 
(2.57) (2.72) (0.94) (1.36) 
lnD
OSO
it -0.041 -0.019 -0.015 0.001 
(1.61) (0.74) (0.74) (0.04) 
DUit 1.130*** 1.087*** 0.510*** 0.454*** 
(6.62) (6.33) (3.85) (3.51) 
RPOPit 0.063*** -0.158 0.049*** -0.235** 
(4.30) (1.21) (3.94) (2.38) 
Hausman test: Chi²; prob. 6.94;0.634 18.03;0.035** 
R² within 0.510 0.530 0.494 0.535 
R² total 0.520 0.084 0.442 0.100 
Note: Significance levels are respectively 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 3. IV random and fixed effects estimates of rapes and other sexual offences 
Variables ln(RAPEit) ln(OSOit) 
 Random effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects 
lnC
RAPE
it -0.141*** -0.150*** -0.335*** -0.250*** 
(2.65) (2.69) (4.19) (3.41) 
lnPRAPEit -4.101*** -3.484** -2.748*** -2.478** 
(3.18) (2.52) (2.72) (2.55) 
lnSRAPEit 0.210* 0.185 -0.102 -0.088 
(1.89) (1.56) (1.07) (0.96) 
lnCOSOit -0.734*** -0.659*** -0.204*** -0.235*** 
(3.82) (3.35) (2.67) (3.21) 
lnP
OSO
it -0.062 -0.044 -0.205*** -0.140** 
(0.80) (0.53) (3.14) (2.23) 
lnF
OSO
it -0.074* -0.079* -0.061* -0.058* 
(1.87) (1.87) (1.85) (1.85) 
lnD
OSO
it -0.020 -0.013 -0.013 0.000 
(0.64) (0.40) (0.50) (0.01) 
DUit 0.434 0.490* 0.816*** 0.698*** 
(1.62) (1.75) (4.41) (4.02) 
RPOPit 0.040 -0.174 0.033 -0.231* 
(0.58) (1.04) (1.62) (1.89) 
R² within 0.319 0.237 0.283 0.288 
R² total 0.313 0.079 0.343 0.084 
Note: Significance levels are respectively 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Endogeneneity-corrected estimates are in bold and 
italic.  
